Energy markets depend on more than supply and demand. Shipping disruptions, recessions and wars all move prices, but a producer can also move them deliberately, most directly by cutting output, in order to gain political influence. As of this writing, Riyadh has given no concrete sign that it intends to use its energy exports as a weapon. The question still stands: has Saudi Arabia used energy as a political tool, and could it do so now?
The 1973 oil crisis is the most prominent episode. On 17 October 1973, during the Arab–Israeli war, the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC), made up of the Arab members of OPEC plus Egypt and Syria, announced production cuts and an embargo on states it saw as backing Israel, chiefly the United States and the Netherlands. Saudi Arabia, under King Faisal, joined the embargo against the United States on 20 October. The aim was to push Western governments to press Israel to withdraw from the Arab territories it had occupied in 1967.
The embargo is the clearest example of energy used as a political tool. The end of the Bretton Woods system, when President Richard Nixon suspended the dollar’s convertibility into gold in 1971, contributed to the recession of 1973–75. OAPEC lifted the embargo on 18 March 1974, when the prospect of an Israeli–Syrian settlement was enough to end it. That followed US diplomacy led by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, including a disengagement agreement between Israel and Egypt in January 1974 and, after the embargo ended, one with Syria in May. A November 1973 statement by the European Community on Resolution 242 had also moved closer to the Arab reading. The episode showed that energy could win diplomatic movement, although Israel did not withdraw to its 1967 lines.
The shift from King Faisal to King Khalid in 1975 showed how a change of monarch could alter energy policy while core orientations such as oil pricing in dollars remained. Oil had already been priced mainly in dollars before 1974. Khalid’s government favoured moderation, on the view that a global recession harms producers and consumers alike. At the OPEC meeting in Doha in December 1976, Saudi Arabia and the UAE held their price rise to 5% while the other eleven members raised theirs by 10%, and Riyadh then said it would raise output to bring the market towards its lower price. Oil Minister Ahmed Zaki Yamani took the decision after consulting Crown Prince Fahd and, by telephone, King Khalid. Since then, Saudi policy has treated oil as an economic commodity rather than a weapon.
Later events narrowed the room for collective Arab action: Egypt’s peace treaty with Israel after Camp David, the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the Gulf states’ reliance on US forces and the end of the Cold War.
Saudi Arabia exported 2.35 billion barrels of crude in 2025, about 6.4 million barrels per day, according to the General Authority for Statistics. That makes it the world’s largest seaborne crude exporter. Exports have since fallen sharply to about 3.2 million barrels per day in August 2026 due to disruptions at the Strait of Hormuz and Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping, as reported by Al-Monitor.
Three motives could push Riyadh towards using oil as a political tool. The first is security. The kingdom is under direct Houthi and Iranian attack, and in theory output cuts could pressure partners to commit more to its defence. The second is Vision 2030, which aims to reduce dependence on oil income but, for now, at times leads Riyadh to cut output to support prices. The third is regional standing. On 28 April 2026, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) announced that it would leave OPEC and OPEC+ as of 1 May, citing its national interest and a desire to expand capacity from about 4.8 million barrels per day to 5 million barrels per day by 2027. Its energy minister said Riyadh had not been consulted, and analysts link the move to a wider rift with Saudi Arabia over Yemen. Qatar had left OPEC earlier, in January 2019. The loss of the UAE’s spare capacity weakens OPEC’s ability to manage the market, and repeated Houthi and Iranian attacks have eroded Riyadh’s prestige. These factors suggest that Riyadh might use output to seek security support from others. They do not show that it intends to.
The official Saudi position is that oil is not a political lever. Investment Minister Khalid Al-Falih said on 8 November 2023, amid the Gaza war, that Saudi Arabia had no plan to use oil production to influence it. As energy minister in 2018, he had also ruled out a repeat of the 1973 embargo. At the WPC Energy Congress in Riyadh on 12 October 2026, Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman said the kingdom would honour its energy commitments, and he described Riyadh as the capital of energy security. Both sets of statements were issued during crises that gave Riyadh a possible reason to act, making them informative.
Concrete constraints back this stance. The policy set under Faisal, despite the embargo, and consolidated under Khalid and Fahd tied Saudi decisions more closely to Washington in political, economic and security matters, a process that culminated in the 1990–91 Gulf crisis. After the US–Saudi Joint Commission on Economic Cooperation was signed on 8 June 1974, Treasury Secretary William Simon visited Jeddah in July and negotiated an arrangement under which Saudi Arabia could invest a large share of its oil surpluses in US Treasury securities, with the purchases kept secret at King Faisal’s request. It was not a treaty obliging Riyadh to price oil in dollars, but it deepened financial interdependence. An abrupt, politically motivated cut would now put Saudi financial interests at risk and invite a firm response from Washington.
Reputation is a second constraint. Since 1974, Riyadh has built an image as a reliable supplier and a safety valve for the market. Sudden price rises resulting from output cuts would damage that image and, with alternative supply now available, accelerate substitution. Third, the scope for unilateral leverage is narrower than it was in 1973, in an international order still heavily shaped by Washington.
The Iran–US war and the Houthi attacks on Saudi territory add a fourth. Riyadh depends on partners and external equipment for its defence, including Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt, the United States and the United Kingdom, and an oil shock would strain those relationships. A fifth is the market itself. The UAE, now outside OPEC, could use extra barrels to win customers if Riyadh cut output, and other OPEC members might distance themselves from abrupt Saudi moves.
Finally, 2026 has shown that in a tight market the political use of energy favours supply. After Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz, Washington issued a series of temporary waivers on Russian oil already at sea, the last of which lapsed on 17 June. That was a unilateral measure to ease shortages, not an understanding with Moscow. Using supply as a political lever is easier for economically and militarily stronger actors than for a nearby state under direct threat.
Under these constraints, a full Saudi oil embargo is highly improbable. Riyadh’s long-standing practice is more likely to continue: timed precautionary adjustments to protect its income, and cautious efforts to draw security, military and diplomatic support from partners. The 2025 export figures show what Riyadh could do. The constraints above explain why it has not.
