India’s foreign policy is facing one of its more difficult tests as the Middle East conflict continues to widen. The war involving the United States and Iran has placed New Delhi in a difficult position. India has important strategic relationships with Washington and Tehran, along with extensive economic and security interests across the Gulf. The crisis has therefore forced India to manage competing relationships at a time when the space for diplomatic ambiguity is shrinking.
Pakistan has moved quickly to make use of this opening. Islamabad has presented itself as a channel between Washington and Tehran and played a role in efforts that produced a temporary ceasefire in April. Pakistan’s diplomatic activity has given it greater visibility at a time when India has maintained a more cautious public position.
The development raises a larger question for New Delhi whether it can preserve its strategic autonomy while maintaining close relations with Washington, protecting its interests in Iran, and retaining its influence in the Gulf.
Tracing India’s Legacy of Diplomatic Prudence
India’s approach to Middle East has historically been shaped by sovereignty, anti-colonialism and strategic independence. During the Suez Crisis in 1956, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru opposed the Anglo-French-Israeli military intervention against Egypt after President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal. India regarded the crisis through the lens of the broader question of sovereignty and the rights of post-colonial states.
India also developed a strong relationship with the Arab world through its support for the Palestinian cause. In 1974, India became one of the first non-Arab countries to recognise the Palestine Liberation Organisation. Its position reflected the foreign-policy outlook of the post-independence period, when New Delhi sought to maintain distance from competing power blocs. The same instinct survived the end of the Cold War. In April 2003, the Indian Parliament unanimously adopted a resolution opposing the US-led invasion of Iraq. India’s foreign policy has since moved in a more pragmatic direction. C. Raja Mohan described this transformation as a movement from moralpolitik towards pragmatic realpolitik.
That shift has given New Delhi greater room to work with different centres of power. India has strengthened its strategic partnership with the United States, expanded defence and technology cooperation, and developed closer relations with Israel. At the same time, it has retained important relationships with Russia, Iran and the Gulf monarchies. The current crisis is testing how much room remains for that balancing act.
Iran in India’s Strategic Calculus
Iran occupies a distinctive place in India’s strategic geography. The relationship has developed over centuries through commercial, cultural and political exchanges. In contemporary strategic terms, Iran has offered India access to Afghanistan and Central Asia while providing an alternative route that does not depend on Pakistani territory. Energy has also been an important component of the relationship. Indian companies invested in Iranian energy projects, including exploration around the Farzad gas fields. US sanctions eventually disrupted these plans and contributed to a sharp decline in India-Iran energy cooperation.
Chabahar remains the most important strategic expression of India’s engagement with Iran. India has invested in the Shahid-Behesti terminal at Chabahar as part of a wider connectivity strategy linking India with Afghanistan and Central Asia. The Indian government has described the port as an important element of its connectivity policy. India’s involvement in Chabahar also carries geopolitical significance. The port provides New Delhi with an avenue into Afghanistan and Central Asia, reducing dependence on routes through Pakistan. Its importance becomes greater when regional trade routes are disrupted by conflict.
The US war against Iran has made that strategic calculation harder. It makes it prudent for India to protect its interests in Iran while avoiding steps that could seriously damage its relationship with Washington. The challenge is particularly acute because sanctions remain a major factor in India’s economic engagement with Tehran. The cost of instability is also being felt beyond Iran. Disruption around the Strait of Hormuz has affected energy markets and shipping. Reuters reported in September that the continuing conflict was still disrupting oil flows and contributing to higher global energy prices. For India, which remains heavily dependent on imported crude oil, prolonged instability in the Gulf has direct economic consequences.
Strategic Autonomy Under Pressure
Strategic autonomy has never meant that India maintains equal distance from every major power. It has meant that New Delhi retains the freedom to make decisions in line with its own interests. The Gulf crisis is putting that principle under pressure. India has good reasons to remain close to the United States. Washington has become an important partner in defence, technology, trade and the Indo-Pacific. At the same time, Iran remains relevant to India’s connectivity ambitions and wider regional strategy.
New Delhi’s cautious response to the conflict reflects this difficult calculation. Former National Security Adviser Shivshankar Menon criticised India’s silence following the killing of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, calling the position “inexplicable” and arguing that it could affect India’s standing among BRICS partners. Menon’s assessment is one interpretation of India’s position, rather than an established measure of its diplomatic standing. The broader concern is easier to identify. A prolonged conflict between Washington and Tehran leaves India with fewer comfortable options.
India therefore needs to protect the relationships that give its foreign policy room to manoeuvre. Engagement with Washington remains important. Engagement with Tehran remains necessary. Relations with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman and other Gulf states are equally significant because of energy supplies, trade, investment and the large Indian community across the region.
BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation can provide additional diplomatic platforms. They cannot replace bilateral diplomacy, but they can give India greater space to support dialogue and communicate its interests alongside other major developing economies.
Pakistan’s Diplomatic Opening
Pakistan has gained unusual diplomatic visibility from the Iran crisis. In April, Islamabad played a significant role in efforts to establish a temporary ceasefire between the United States and Iran. Pakistani officials passed messages between Washington and Tehran and helped create conditions for direct negotiations. Reuters reported that Pakistani civil and military leaders mounted an intensive diplomatic push when the ceasefire talks were on the verge of collapse.
The significance of this role should not be exaggerated. Pakistan has not become the sole channel between Washington and Tehran, and the negotiations have remained fragile. Qatar has also been active in mediating between the two sides, with fresh diplomatic efforts taking place during the UN General Assembly in September. Still, Pakistan has secured a diplomatic opening. Its geographic position helps. Pakistan borders Iran and has longstanding relationships with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. Islamabad can therefore speak to actors that occupy different positions within the regional security system.
The Makkah Joint Defence Agreement with Saudi Arabia and Turkey has added another dimension to Pakistan’s regional profile. Signed in August, the agreement provides for collective defence commitments among the three countries. Military chiefs from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey met in Riyadh in September to discuss intelligence sharing, military coordination and implementation of the pact. The agreement does not automatically make Pakistan a mediator between Iran and the Gulf. In fact, its security commitments could create new complications for Islamabad as tensions involving Iran and Saudi Arabia develop. Pakistan has sought to maintain communication with Tehran while strengthening its security relationship with Riyadh. That balancing act has given Islamabad diplomatic relevance at a moment when the Gulf security architecture is being reshaped.
What India Needs to Watch
Pakistan’s diplomatic activity should not be viewed as a zero-sum contest in which every gain for Islamabad represents a loss for New Delhi. India’s interests in the Gulf are considerably broader and rest on economic, demographic, commercial and strategic foundations developed over decades. The more important issue is whether New Delhi is making full use of those relationships. India has a substantial presence in the Gulf through its diaspora. Remittances, energy imports, investment, shipping and trade bind India closely to the region. New Delhi also has increasingly strong political relationships with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar and Oman. These connections give India considerable diplomatic assets. The challenge is to use them more actively during a crisis that directly affects India’s economic and strategic interests. The Gulf states themselves are pursuing multiple relationships. They work with Washington on security, maintain economic links with China, engage India on trade and investment, and preserve channels with Tehran. India can operate within this flexible regional environment without abandoning its partnership with the United States.
Way Forward
India does not need to choose between Washington and Tehran. It needs to protect its ability to engage both. That requires a foreign policy that is confident enough to express disagreement with major powers when Indian interests demand it, while preserving the partnerships that remain important to India’s security and economic growth. New Delhi should deepen its engagement with Iran on Chabahar and regional connectivity while maintaining a clear dialogue with Washington on sanctions and India’s energy and connectivity interests. At the same time, India should use its expanding relationships with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar and Oman to remain closely connected to the changing Gulf security environment. The current crisis also offers an opportunity to strengthen India’s role in multilateral forums. BRICS, the SCO and other platforms can complement bilateral diplomacy and provide channels for India to support de-escalation.
Pakistan’s recent diplomatic activity is a reminder that regional influence can change quickly when a crisis creates demand for intermediaries. Islamabad has used its geography, relationships and military-diplomatic networks to gain visibility. India has different advantages, built around its economic weight, global partnerships, Gulf relationships and long-standing presence in the region. The Gulf crisis is therefore less a contest between India and Pakistan than a test of how effectively each country converts its strategic assets into diplomatic influence. For New Delhi, the central task is to preserve strategic autonomy while remaining actively engaged in shaping the regional order around it.
