The rise of China was the biggest rupture in the new world order. The Americans’ strategy needed an overhaul, and the world was slowly embracing a non-Western World Order. The rise of multilateralism and Chinese power manifested that horizon. However, it appeared that the dawn was yet to see a silver lining. The American order is yet to be overshadowed. Chinese response toward the US-Israeli unlawful war on Iran cracks its ambitions wide open. The jury is still out in the open, but the future holds no serious ground for China amidst its nonchalant response to Trump’s madness. Although it’s too early, for a moment, China’s ambition died with the fall of Ayatollah Khamenei in Iran.
Americans have called their new war ‘Operation Epic Fury’, Israel named it ‘Roaring Lion’, and Iranians responded with ‘Operation True Promise IV’, marking a new wave of geopolitical tensions. The clash of operations has gone beyond the Middle East. The Gulf neighbours are teething with a barrage of Iranian drones and ballistic missiles, taking the region to the cusp of disaster. The critical shift, however, won’t be limited to what happens in Iran after Khomeini, but also to how it has challenged the Chinese ambition to become a global power. China’s act of play so far seems to reveal its serious limitations in playing hard in global politics. It has lost its big moment to carve a new alternative. Chinese strategy to wait for an unending time to play its part might face multiple shocks, as international politics still holds to one cold reality: power and fear are instruments to build a global power image.
Amidst incoherence, the post-Khamenei order has taken the region and the world into a black swan. The vocabulary of the new order, amidst the hullabaloo over the Global South and BRICS, has failed to respond to how the world still lies under the rubble of Uncle Sam. The Chinese response, along with an exhausted Russia and a muted Indian response, would shape the future of the non-Western world order. Iran’s war has unleashed many realities, including the infancy of strategic autonomy.
The post-Khamenei order
The joint operation led to the assassination of Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and led to the start of a full-fledged war between Iran and the US-Israel duo. The war, at the time of writing, has led to over 1300 deaths in Iran, primarily due to heavy airstrikes, including over 180 children. Retaliatory Iranian strikes have caused at least 11 deaths in Israel, and 6 American soldiers were killed in Iranian airstrikes over a US military base in Kuwait. The American military bases in the region have been targeted by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps of Iran, with most strikes hitting the bases throughout the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The Iranian navy has successfully blocked the Strait of Hormuz, affecting global oil prices and straining the global economy.
The first response from Beijing, immediately after the attacks, was a round of phone calls to various Gulf capitals, calling for restraint and emphasising dialogue and diplomacy as the way forward. This marks a repetition of the diplomatic rhetoric given by China post the 12-day war in support of Iran.
The ministry’s call for “relevant parties to stop military operations”- a request that includes Iran as well as the USA and Israel, and its vocal support for respecting “sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity” of Gulf states, suggests that China is trying to stay on good terms with countries in the Gulf as much as with Iran.
This hands-off approach to Iran has been a long time coming. Since the October 7 attacks carried out by Hamas, Beijing has increasingly grown disillusioned with Tehran’s capability as a regional power. Iran’s consistent desire to negotiate with the USA has been viewed as a weakness by policymakers in Beijing. Until the protracted war of attrition begins to disrupt oil supplies through the Strait of Hormuz, Beijing seems to be comfortable with doing business with whoever is in power in Tehran. The region has historically been at the forefront of great power politics, given its strategic, economic and cultural significance. The current crisis follows the 12-day war in 2025 and is a culmination of half a century of tension between the USA and Iran since the 1979 Iranian revolution. Before the war, the US policy was self-sabotaging its hegemonic presence. The obsession of Trump’s administration with MAGA (Make America Great Again) was making the US an unacceptable world power, including for Europe. The rise of China was about to meet its moment of reality. The shrinking USA’s influence and the burgeoning economic, political and strategic ties between PRC and the Arab and Islamic world have been a well-established fact.
China has been at the forefront of the new shift. Being the largest energy importer from the Middle East, its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a 25-year-long comprehensive agreement with Iran and as a peacemaker by brokering peace between the two regional hegemon- Saudi Arabia and Iran- made it a suitable power that can replace the US without becoming global police. All seems to have gone into a tailspin for China, at least for the near future.
Implications For Beijing
Given China’s deep economic, strategic and political interests in the region, the recent tensions between Iran and the US-Israel have deep repercussions for Beijing. Given the instability in the region, the supply of crude oil becomes the first casualty of the war. China’s oil dependency on the Middle East makes it an important stakeholder advocating peace between the warring factions and requiring an active involvement in the region. China might have succeeded in getting its vessels across the Strait of Hormuz under Tehran’s protection, but merely issuing statements and calling for peace does not bode well for an aspiring superpower. Beijing’s absence from action during the crisis has cast doubt on its image as a responsible global power and, more importantly, as an ally. It is to be noted that Beijing has been the main supporter of the Islamic regime in Tehran, providing it with essential military hardware, intelligence and being the largest buyer of the Iranian crude oil. However, Beijing’s inaction in not being able to back its long-time ally during a conflict raises questions about the Chinese security umbrella.
The war has been taking a heavy toll on the global economy, and China is no exception. Being a product of globalisation, the Chinese economy has been under pressure since the beginning of the conflict. Before the war began, the International Monetary Fund expected the global economy to grow by a healthy 3.3% this year. Brent crude, the global oil benchmark, is trading at levels not seen in more than 18 months. A prolonged war that keeps energy prices high could drive up inflation and, with it, interest rates, piling on the pain for borrowers.
Meanwhile, threats to cargo ships could further snarl supply chains, raising prices for businesses and consumers. The war has put billions of dollars in investments at risk, and it would require the Chinese firm to have a strong risk appetite, not only to brace for the war’s impact but also to hit the ground running in a post-conflict scenario.
The world’s second-largest economy continues to battle low consumption, a prolonged property crisis, and a huge local debt. A prolonged conflict will disrupt other regions important to China; African economies, for instance, have been beneficiaries of substantial and steady flows of Gulf capital. If the investment goes out, this risks wider instability that undermines the sustainability of China’s broader and long-term interests.
What lies for BRICS and India?
China’s careful balancing in the Middle East must define its global positioning. As of now, it has neither been overtly supportive of Iran nor a serious critique of Israel’s defiance of any international law. Moreover, it has been reluctant to directly join an armed confrontation against the USA, taking a direct hit on its ability as a security provider to its allies. Further, multilateral organisations like BRICS have struggled to issue a joint statement in favour of its permanent member, Iran and seem to be divided to reach a consensus, given India’s closeness to Israel and Iran’s retaliatory strikes on the UAE. The bloc has been routinely divided and seemingly paralysed by differing agendas and a lack of alignment on global issues. But its inability to respond to an attack and to attempt to overthrow the government of a permanent member of the bloc may just be the most damaging blow to its credibility.
India, on the contrary, didn’t respond to the crisis; rather, it exposed its so-called strategic autonomy when Iran was bombarded right after Prime Minister Modi’s return from Israel. The situation was further compounded when New Delhi refused to condemn the assassination of Ayatollah Khamenei, casting a shadow on India’s neutrality. Either India has lost its moral face in the hands of Trump’s maximum pressure, or this is the new reality unsettling India’s long-held principle of strategic autonomy and maligning its good intentions of representing the Global South. Indian foreign policy needs coherence sans risking its sovereignty in decision-making. The present looks scary for non-American order-making China and its BRICS partners, including India, almost becoming vassal states.
