The recurring question of whether the Iranian regime is on the verge of collapse oversimplifies the country’s political resilience and overlooks the complex social and geopolitical factors shaping its trajectory. Assertions about the imminent fall of the Islamic Republic, frequently amplified in Western media narratives, often rely on selective interpretations of domestic unrest while ignoring the deeper institutional and historical roots of the Iranian state.
The scholars of West Asian Studies say that the Iranian regime is not a house of cards as the Western media wants us to believe. The projection of Iran in the Western media is what AK Ramakrishnan, in his book US Perception of Iran: Approaches and Policies, calls American Orientalism and imperialism, which stereotypes the Iranian revolution, Islam and Iranian politics, leading to distorted and reductive perceptions. The regime of the Islamic Republic is not a version of Iraqi or Syrian Ba’athism, nor is it a distant cousin of the Sheikhdoms of the Gulf. The Islamic regime has deeper roots in the Iranian socio-political landscape, which underlines its resilience and enduring presence. The people’s resentment is a vital reality, and, in my opinion, primarily stems from the hardships imposed by the crippling sanctions and the delay in reforms in an era when social media is a tool of soft warfare.
The Islamic regime came into being after the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, heavily driven by anti-Americanism for its gaze over the natural resources of Iran. The collective memory that has shaped Iranian politics is well-documented and laden with the history of imperial projects. The imperialism of Britain and Russia, followed by the 1953 coup and overthrow of democratically elected Prime Minister Muhammad Musadegh, was focused on protecting the Western oil interests in the region, and is the cornerstone of anti-imperialism in Iran. The US administration installed the authoritarian regime and supported it in building SAVAK, the infamous secret police of the Shah. The SAVAK’s crime against the Iranian people is well documented. In return, the Shah agreed to give a significant share of Iran’s oil profits to the American companies. The Islamic Revolution was a unanimous expression and answer of all Iranians to this exploitation in neo-colonisation and neo-imperialism.
Iran has a long history of a social fabric in which Ulema, or Islamic scholars, play a significant role. Iran officially became an Islamic empire by adopting Twelver Shia Islam in the sixteenth century. Afterwards, the country became a safe abode for Shia Islamic learning (though Iranian land had also produced rich Sunni Islamic teachings before the Safavid rule). The Ulema served as auditors for successive governments on behalf of the people during the Qajar rule. The Qajar-ulema relations shaped the political opposition in Iran. Ayatollah Mirza Shirazi’s Tobacco Fatwa is a unique case for resisting imperialism and protecting Iran’s sovereignty and the economic interests of its people. The 1905 constitution revolution was not a secular initiative or Iranian response to the European Enlightenment, as was the case with various constitutions of the developing world. The Constitution and the constitution movement had a strong backing from the Ulema. With diverse forces present, the Islamic Revolution was led by the clergy. Therefore, Ulema have an organic place, developed vertically, with bilateral interaction with society.
Estranged from the Western interpretation of the protests in Iran, I examine these protests from the perspective of the international sanctions imposed by the West, led by the US. The sanctions are not only a prohibition on arms but also an economic embargo that includes a ban on Iranian imports, sanctions on Iranian financial bodies, and a complete prohibition on selling or repairing aircraft to the Iranian aviation industry. Automatically, skyrocketing inflation and decreased household income. The strain translates into a weaker currency, higher prices, fewer jobs, and greater difficulty accessing basic needs.
The people’s vulnerabilities, true to the rationale for the sanctions, escalated as the demand for reform in the country rose in parallel. Rightfully, the decades after the revolution demanded reformative legislation, the softening of strict laws, and special attention to women’s rights. The debate between people and the system played out in the domestic political sphere, as reflected in the elections and forms of protest. The reform of the Iranian regime is not an overnight phenomenon. The intellectual umbilical cord of the Iranian regime traces its roots to Ijtihad, which focuses on renewing laws and considers context.
However, the propaganda machinery identified the loophole that ignored the impact of the sanctions on an average Iranian or closed its eyes to the atrocities elsewhere, weaponised it. The tension was bound to intensify due to social media. There is one more element to the conflict that reminds me of the term ‘westoxification’ coined by Jalal Ale Ahmed, which says that adopting the West will erode Iran’s autonomy, and its seeds are well present in the spot.
The triangular friction created tension between the regime and the people of Iran. The Orientalised Western media got a recipe to distort the Islamic regime. In addition to the economic sanctions, full-scale wars in its neighbourhood, violent regime changes, civil wars, and, later, a direct military assault have manufactured a layer of instability. Furthering the wrath, over a period of time, the Islamic Republic of Iran is confronting Israel over the Palestinian cause on the brink. On one hand, Iran is locking horns with Israel, and on the other hand, the US-allied Muslim rulers have isolated Iran. Recognising these distortions can help the audience develop a more nuanced understanding of Iran’s situation and resilience.
For this reason, predictions of the regime’s imminent collapse often underestimate the depth of Iran’s political institutions and social structures. Simplistic narratives that portray the Islamic Republic solely as a coercive regime ignore the historical processes that produced it and the domestic constituencies that continue to shape its evolution.
Understanding Iran requires recognising the country’s agency, historical experience, and internal debates rather than reducing its politics to external expectations. Only by situating contemporary developments within this broader historical and geopolitical context can observers develop a more nuanced understanding of Iran’s resilience and its evolving political landscape.
The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Middle East Outlook (MEO).
