The 18th-century Prussian general and military theorist Carl von Clausewitz once famously said that“war is a continuation of politics by other means”. But he would have had little reason to assume that his words would resonate with the currents of global politics in the 21st century. Scholars might argue that war is just a breakdown of diplomacy, or, as per the liberal peace theory, it is the authoritarian/anti-democratic political structure of a nation-state that is responsible for war. However, war in our times is very much a continuation of politics by other means. This century has been replete with examples that attempt to explain the Clausewitzian paradigm.
First, it is to be noted that war as a phenomenon is as old as humanity itself. Going by the Hobbesian philosophy, man previously lived in a forest, an arena of constant struggle which Thomas Hobbes defined as ‘a state of war of all against all’. Driven by the urge for self-preservation, man decided to sign a contract under which every individual agreed to surrender their rights to an absolute sovereign who was given the authority to protect the lives of all individuals and maintain order in society. Hobbes observed, “I and fear were born together”, implying that the individual is fearful and suspicious by nature. The mechanistic process of the human brain often induces fear of others, and this defines a defensive attitude that is the cradle for conflicts and, ultimately, war.
For Clausewitz, war was essentially a business left to sovereign states competing militarily, and it would ultimately result in a decisive military victory for one side over the other. For almost two centuries, this was the standard definition of war. However, with advances in military technology and the emergence of Artificial intelligence, the paradigm of war has transformed decisively, making it difficult for current dynamics to fit into the Clausewitzian model.
The wars of the 21st century challenge Clausewitz’s definition of war in every sense. Today, these involve non-state actors with sovereign backing, essentially fought not for a geopolitical victory, but for economic predation. This, in turn, makes the continuation of war a lucrative business rather than peaceful disengagement. Hence, the cost of continuing the war becomes less than stopping it altogether.
There are many examples which essentially support this argument, but the case of Russia is the most appropriate. Ever since Vladimir Putin took office as President of the Russian Federation, the country’s security apparatus has significantly influenced its foreign policy, shifting it from a cooperative stance with the United States-led Western bloc, as represented by North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) countries, to a more confrontational one. Moscow’s tryst with NATO started during the Yeltsin years (1992-1999), ended with its invasions of Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2022.
Firstly, the 2008 Georgian War is important for understanding how the dynamics of war have transformed and largely contradict Clausewitzian paradigms. This war is viewed by many scholars as a landmark event in the realm of ‘cyber’ warfare, predating the widespread adoption of the term ‘hybrid war’ and marking Russia’s strategic approach to regain lost ground following the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Following President Bush’s assurances to Ukraine and Georgia of NATO memberships at the bloc’s Bucharest summit in 2008, the Moscow-backed South Ossetian forces started bombing the Georgian villages. Russia launched a full-scale military campaign by accusing the Georgian forces of committing “genocide” and “aggression” against the Ossetian people. It subsequently recognised South Ossetia and Abkhazia as sovereign states, thereby directly challenging Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Yet, the Russian military campaign, as Moscow reasoned, stemmed from Washington’s recurrent breaches of promises made to Russia at the end of the Cold War, not to allow NATO to move an inch eastward. The Western bloc expanded NATO in 1999 and 2004 – acts seen as crossing Russia’s Rubicon. The Georgian campaign as such represented as an offensive defence policy by the Russians.
What distinguished the Russian military campaign was its use of cyber attacks alongside traditional combat, which it first used against Estonia a year earlier, targeting Georgian government websites, media outlets and financial institutions, thereby creating widespread confusion and anarchy. Russian cyber attacks aimed to deny, degrade and destroy information inside Georgia’s computer networks while gathering intelligence. Numerous websites were digitally vandalised with images comparing President Saakashvili to Adolf Hitler, highlighting the psychological aspect of the cyberattacks. Advanced techniques, such as SQL injection, were used to infiltrate networks and access sensitive information, further destabilising Georgia’s ability to respond. Additionally, Russian cyber operatives manipulated CNN’s online polls, framing international opinion in favour of Russia, describing Russian actions as legitimate.
Secondly, the conflict between Russia and Ukraine started in 2014 when Moscow decided to annex Crimea, followed by a full-scale military invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Firstly, the Crimea annexation was executed by a calibrated hybrid warfare strategy that included covert special forces, private militias (little green men) and conventional military units. The military expedition was launched in parallel with cyber operations aimed at delegitimising Ukraine and shaping international and domestic opinion in its favour. The strategy focused upon military swiftness, tactical ambiguity and psychological operations, which allowed effective Russian control over Crimea with minimum direct military confrontation while effectively neutralising Ukrainian and NATO responses.
The 2022 invasion became an extension of this strategy. Russia supported militias in eastern Ukraine (Luhansk and Donetsk regions) and subsequently challenged Ukrainian sovereignty by recognising the Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic. During this war, weaponising of cyberspace and the misinformation campaign have been central to its war strategy. Since 2014, Ukraine has registered more than 5000 cyberattacks on state institutions and critical infrastructure. Since mid-2021, Russian hackers have been targeting digital service providers, logistics providers and supply chains in Ukraine and abroad. This has been complemented by the use of Private militias, such as the Wagner Group, and established networks of “useful idiots” and influencers across Europe.
The use of private military companies and characterising the invasion as “special military operations” aimed at absolving the Russian state of the war crimes. The established network throughout Europe is used for running disinformation campaigns and influencing the psychological outcomes of war. Moreover, consolidating domestic support based on nationalism and running the entire economy on war, as demonstrated by Russia’s oil and weapons trade with the global south, makes war a lucrative business, reducing the cost of conflict, consequently explaining the ongoing protracted conflict in Ukraine.
Clausewitz’s dictum that war is the continuation of politics by other means remains analytically powerful, yet its contemporary manifestation has undergone a profound transformation. The Russian experiences in Georgia and Ukraine illustrate how modern warfare operates in the grey zone between war and peace, through cyber operations, disinformation, proxy forces, private military companies, and calibrated ambiguity, while retaining its fundamentally political character. As such, what distinguishes contemporary warfare is not the abandonment of Clausewitzian logic, but its mutation. War today is increasingly sustained not merely to achieve territorial or geopolitical objectives, but because its continuation serves strategic, economic, and regime-survival interests. Thus, rather than rendering Clausewitz obsolete, the wars of the 21st century compel a re-reading of his ideas.
