Summary: China’s muted role in the Iran-Israel conflict reveals its careful balancing act between strategic neutrality and deep regional interests. Despite strong ties with Iran, Beijing avoided military involvement to protect its economic investments and maintain regional neutrality. This cautious posture underscores China’s broader foreign policy strategy of avoiding direct confrontation while preserving influence.
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China condemned Israeli and U.S. actions but refrained from offering military support to Iran, signalling its consistent preference for non-intervention.
With $500+ billion in regional trade and major energy dependence on the Middle East, China prioritizes stability over ideological alignment.
Any Chinese involvement risked escalation with the U.S., whose defence capabilities still far outpace China’s.
A toppled Iranian regime could align with the West, undercutting China’s influence and weakening the Russia-China bloc.
China appears to be buying time, preserving its global position while avoiding entanglement in high-risk conflicts.
Despite the growing belief among many scholars about the return of bipolarity in the international system helmed by China and the United States, China’s major absence from the recent military escalation between Iran and Israel has raised questions over any such transformation. This was surprising given that the Chinese government has built strong relations with the Iranian regime over the years, positioning Tehran as an integral part of the Beijing-led global bloc. This is especially valid after the formalization of a historic 25-year cooperation program with both Iran and China in 2021, on top of China’s propelling Iran into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and frequently affording it diplomatic and economic support.
Yet, this all-weather Sino-Iranian friendship failed to translate into any military alliance, with Beijing hesitating to extend its support to Tehran during the June 2025 Israel-Iran war. China’s hesitance within the broader international power dynamics is instructive given how the U.S., its global competitor, deployed its full might in support of Israel. Although Chinese official statements condemned the Israeli and U.S. attacks on Iran’s sovereignty and endorsed Iran’s right to self-defence, however, no substantial help was extended beyond these statements, which left Tehran standing on its own in its hour of urgency.
Those who have been watching China’s foreign policy for years would not be taken aback at these muted responses from China. Although China has not always precisely abided by a non-interference policy and even strategically supplied arms to countries during armed conflicts, it has constantly sought to enrich its image as a neutral player in a world of diplomacy to promote world peace. As a result, it avoids being seen as providing overt military support to any side during wars. Take the example of the Russia-Ukraine war: China’s closest ally, Russia, has been involved in a three-year conflict, yet China’s military support has remained minimal, especially when compared with Western support for Ukraine.
Eager to project its policy of neutrality even in the Iran-Iraq war, China did not provide any significant military assistance to Iran. However, it does not mean that China was seeking to continue or widen the war in the region, or sought to weaken Iran, as some scholars claimed. For China, there was no benefit of destabilization, and to maintain the status quo was preferable. China’s desire to avoid regional destabilization stems from several key factors.
For a long time, China’s major concerns in the Middle East have included its energy security, the success of its Belt and Road Initiative projects, and political cooperation with regional countries. Although it has recently increased its imports of Russian oil, mainly due to significant discounts, China continues to import about 40-50% of its oil requirements from Middle Eastern countries.
Over the years, China has made enormous investments in Middle Eastern countries. Its total investment in Saudi Arabia between 2021 to October 2024 was $21.6 billion. Total investments in the UAE from 2012 to 2022 were $11.88 billion; its total investments in Iran have been $5 billion since 2007. China’s trade with regional states in 2022 was $507 billion. Further, the UAE alone has around 400,000 Chinese workers. Undoubtedly, if anything escalated, the security of Chinese workers would not be the only implication, but its billions of dollars of investments and trade would be at a significant risk too.
China’s problem in the region is its substantial interests in all the major countries, making it difficult to take sides without risking its broader strategic goals. This predicament stems from its foreign policy, which is mainly based on economics; it has signed economic deals, built infrastructure, and increased energy cooperation for various objectives, including securing markets for its overproduced goods. China is already flooding the markets of many countries with its overproduced goods, effectively de-industrializing those economies.
Thus, Chinese interests are directly linked to stability in the region. For instance, the mere blockage of the Strait of Hormuz, for which Iran’s Majlis passed a resolution, could disrupt more than 50% of China’s oil supply. Though China could supplement it from other sources, including Russia, two problems may emerge. One is logistical, as ensuring about 50% of its oil supply from alternative sources would require a large number of fleets, ships, and containers, which is extremely difficult to arrange in a short period. Second, a shortage in the global oil supply would likely drive up prices, putting additional pressure on the Chinese economy, which is already reporting a slowdown.
Moreover, the course of the 12-day war made Israel’s military dominance unmistakably clear, with Israel destroying a significant part of Iran’s ballistic missile stockpile, striking nuclear sites, assassinating Iranian military leaders and establishing total air control over Iranian skies. This suggests that had the war continued and, with active U.S. participation, it may have caused great problems for Iran’s regime. There is no question that any new regime would not have the support from Israel and the U.S., consequently making it very unlikely that it would recognize Chinese interests. This would have been Beijing’s worst-case scenario.
The collapse of the Iranian regime would have been seen as a major blow to the Russia-China bloc in the broader global rivalry with the U.S., especially after the fallout of the Assad regime in Syria. Even the weakening of Iran is a bad sign for China’s global aspirations; worse still, China’s lack of interest in helping its closest ally prevent regime collapse would have sent a negative signal throughout the world to current or potential Chinese allies.
Another reason that may have held China back from providing military support to Iran is the harsh reality. China’s per capita GDP is almost one-sixth of the U.S., and its defence budget is one-fourth that of the U.S. Any Chinese involvement could make the conflict risky and escalate the war, given that China cannot match U.S. military strength. It was logical for China to stay out of any direct war with the U.S. This has led many to argue that China is buying time before risking a direct military confrontation.
For now, there appears to be peace in the Middle East. But given that the two reasons Israel launched its war on Iran, including toppling the regime and eliminating Iran’s nuclear program, remain unfulfilled, Israel, emboldened by its military performance, could attack enriched uranium stocks at any time. This increases the likelihood of another war. If a second round of clashes begins, it would be hard for China to continue walking a tightrope without losing anything.
The views expressed are the authors’ own.
